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I. INTRODUCTION

One of the greatest controversies in the field of state taxation
today concerns the constitutional authority of the states to impose

sales or use taxes on goods purchased over the Internet.1 Forty-five
Associate Professor, Santa Clara University School of Law. I
owe thanks to
Vinita Bali, June Carbone, David Franklin, Walter Hellerstein, Jeff Kahn, Frank
Katz, Kerry Macintosh, Gary Neustadter, Margaret Russell, Gary Spitko, Sri
Srinivasan, Srija Srinivasan, and John Swain for their assistance and comments on
previous drafts. Thanks also to the participants in a works-in-progress forum at Santa
Clara University School of Law for their valuable insights.
For a small sample of the academic discussion, see David T. Brown, No Easy
Solutions in the Sales Tax on E-Commerce Debate: Lessons from the Advisory
Commission on Electronic Commerce Report to Congress, 27 J. CORP. L. 117 (2001);
Arthur J. Cockficld, Designing Tax Policy for the Digital Biosphere: How the Internet
Is Changing Tax Laws, 34 CONN. L. REv. 333 (2002); Walter Hellerstein,
Deconstructingthe Debate over State Taxation of Electronic Commerce, 13 HARV. J.L.
& TECH. 549 (2000); Walter Hellerstein, State Taxation of Electronic Commerce, 52
TAX L. REV. 425 (1997); Kendall L. Houghton & Walter Hcllcrstein, State Taxation of
Electronic Commerce: Perspectives on Proposals for Change and Their
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states currently impose general retail sales and use taxes on most
tangible goods that are purchased or used within their borders.
Together, these taxes impose a one-time exaction on most goods
ultimately consumed within the taxing state, regardless of the seller's
location. Sales and use taxes are vital to the states' present fiscal
health, accounting for 33 percent of state tax revenue nationwide 3 and
more than $183 billion annually.4
But sales consummated over the Internet-more broadly, sales
consummated with out-of-state sellers through whatever means-have
contributed to a substantial and growing gap in the sales and use tax
structure Under prevailing constitutional law, states lack jurisdiction
to require out-of-state vendors to collect a sales or use tax when the
vendor has no "physical presence" in the taxing state.6 For example,
suppose a California resident purchases a book from Amazon.com,
Inc. through its web site. The purchaser's use of that book in
California is subject to California's use tax, but the only practical
means for the state to enforce the tax is to have Amazon.com collect
the levy at the time of sale. Because Amazon.com has no physical
presence in California, however-it neither owns nor rents property in
the state, hires no employees or independent contractors there, and

Constitutionality, 2000 BYU L. REV. 9 (2000); Michael Mazerov & Iris J. Lav,
Problems with a 'Moratorium' on Internet Commerce Taxation, 14 ST. TAX NOTES
1697 (1998); Michael J. McIntyre, Taxing Electronic Commerce Fairly and Efficiently,
52 TAX L. REV. 625 (1997); Charles E. McLure, Jr., Sales and Use Taxes on Electronic
Commerce: Legal, Economic, Administrative, and Political Issues, 34 URB. LAW. 487
(2002); Robert D. Plattner, Quill: Ten Years After, 25 ST. TAX NOTES 1017, 1020-21
(2002); Richard D. Pomp & Michael J. McIntyre, State Taxation of Mail-OrderSales
of Computers After Quill- An Evaluationof MTC Bulletin 95-1, 11 ST. TAX NOTES 177
(1996); John A. Swain, Cybertaxation and the Commerce Clause: Entity Isolation or
Affiliate Nexus?, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 419 (2002); Dennis Zimmerman, The Internet
Sales Tax Debate: Sorting Through the Economic Issues, 22 ST. TAX NOTES 1001, 1001
(2001).
2 DAVID BRUNORI, STATE TAX POLICY: A POLITICAL PERSPECTIVE 67
(2001); 2
JEROME R. HELLERSTEIN & WALTER HELLERSTEIN, STATE TAXATION

12.02 (3d ed.

2002).
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATE GOVERNMENT TAX COLLECTIONS:

2002 (2003),

available at http://www.census.gov/govs/statetax/0200usstax.html.
4 John L. Mikesell, State Retail Sales Taxes, 1999-2001: The Recession
Hits, 27
ST. TAX NOTES 489, 489 (2003).
' See BRUNORI, supra note 2, at 75-76; Charles E. McLure, Jr., Electronic
Commerce and the Tax Assignment Problem:Preserving State Sovereignty in a Digital
World, 14 ST. TAX NOTES 1169, 1176-77 (1998).
6 See Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 309-19 (1992); 2 HELLERSTEIN

& HELLERSTEIN, supra note 2, at T 19.02[3][c].
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delivers all of its merchandise into the state through common
carriers- California is constitutionally prohibited from requiring
Amazon.com to collect the tax. Absent the unlikely event of the
purchaser voluntarily remitting the tax to California,7 the purchase
completely escapes sales or use taxation. It is estimated that this hole
in the sales and use tax system cost the states nearly $11 billion in
revenue in 2003.8
The constitutional basis for this jurisdictional rule, according to
the Supreme Court, is the dormant Commerce Clause. The Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment also places limits on
the states' jurisdiction to tax, limits that are very similar to those that
restrain a state's adjudicative jurisdiction.9 But the Commerce Clause
demands something more-specifically, a "substantial nexus" between
the taxing state and any activity or person that the state seeks to tax. l0
And the Court has concluded that, at least with respect to the
obligation to collect use taxes, such a "substantial nexus" exists only
when a person or firm is physically present in the taxing state. 1I (The
Court has so far reserved the question whether this physical presence
standard also applies to other tax obligations, such as remitting
income tax.' 2) Without a physical presence requirement, the Court
has reasoned, interstate sellers might be subjected to use tax collection
obligations in every state in which they have customers, despite having
only minimal contacts with those jurisdictions, and collectively these
compliance obligations would impose an "undue burden" on
interstate commerce."
7 See William F. Fox & LeAnn Luna, Subnational Taxing Options:
Which Is
Preferred, a Retail Sales Tax or VAT?, 27 ST. TAX NOTES 875, 877 n.12 (2003)

(describing use tax compliance by individuals through self-assessment as "nearly
nonexistent"); Kirk J. Stark, The Uneasy Casefor Extending the Sales Tax to Services,
29 ST. TAX NOTES 211, 216 & n.49 (2003); Tracey Kaplan, State Seeks Bonus from
Obscure Tax: Yacht Owner's Story Illustrates Assessment, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS,
July 26, 2003, available at http://www.bayarea.com/mld/mercurynews/news/
6390032.htm (last visited July 28, 2003) (reporting that only 322 California residents
voluntarily remitted use taxes in 2002, generating revenue of $20,700, and that
roughly $1.24 billion in use taxes went unpaid in California in 2002).
8 Zimmerman, supra note
1, at 1001.
9 See Quill, 504 U.S. at 306-08.
1o Id. at 311-13.
11 Id.
12 See John A. Swain, State Income Tax Jurisdiction:
A Jurisprudentialand
Policy Perspective, 45 WM. & MARY L. REv. 319, 321-26 (2003).
13 See Quill, 504 U.S. at 312-19 & n.6; Nat'l Bellas Hess, Inc.
v. Dep't of
Revenue, 386 U.S. 753, 758-60 (1967).
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This dormant Commerce Clause nexus requirement has been the
subject of heated debate, especially in recent years. Many believe the
"bright line" standard of physical presence settles expectations,
reduces litigation, and properly reflects the principle that "a business
should [not] have to pay tax to a jurisdiction unless that jurisdiction is
providing benefits and protections to the business.' ' 14 They have
advocated extending the physical presence standard to other levies,
most notably corporate income taxes. 5 Others argue that the
requirement of physical presence is arbitrary and anachronistic"artificial through and through" 6-and

tax avoidance."'
14

7

that it is "essentially a tool for
They contend that tax jurisdiction should instead be

Timothy Catts, Sparks Fly over Business Activity Nexus at TEI Conference, 27

ST. TAX NOTES 1161, 1161 (2003) (statement of Arthur R. Rosen, chair of the state
and local tax practice at McDermott, Will & Emery).
15 See, e.g., id.; Timothy Catts, Federal Bill Would Link 'Streamlining' to
Business Activity Tax, 27 ST. TAX NOTES 371, 371 (2003). In July 2002, the House
Judiciary Subcommittee on Commercial and Administrative Law approved the
"Business Activity Modernization Act." See Doug Sheppard, 2002 in the States:
'Streamlining' Quiet After the Internet Tax Storm, 26 ST. TAX NOTES 906, 909 (2002).
The bill provided, in relevant part, that
No State or subdivision thereof shall have power to impose, for any taxable
year ending after the date of enactment of this title, a business activity tax
on any person relating to such person's activities that affect interstate
commerce, unless such person has a substantial physical presence in such
State or subdivision.
H.R. 2526, 107th Cong. § 101(a) (2002). The bill was not considered by the full House
Judiciary Committee, however, and thus never reached the House floor. See
Sheppard, supra, at 109. On October 1, 2003, Representatives Bob Goodlatte and
Rick Boucher (both of Virginia) re-introduced legislation containing very similar
language:
Except as otherwise provided by this Act, no taxing authority of a
State shall have power to impose, assess, or collect a net income tax or
other business activity tax on any person relating to such person's
activities in interstate commerce, unless such person has a physical
presence in the State during the taxable period with respect to which
the tax is imposed.
H.R. 3220, 108th Cong. § 3(a) (2003). The bill was referred to the House Judiciary
Committee, but as of late March 2004, no further action had been taken. See Kerrita
McClaughlyn, Surprise, Surprise: Business, Government Reps Clash on BA T Nexus, 31
ST. TAX NOTES 980, 980 (2004).
16 Plattner, supra note 1, at 1017.
17 Dan Bucks & Frank Katz, Explanation of the Multistate Tax Commission's
Proposed Factor Presence Nexus Standard, 25 ST. TAX NOTES 1037, 1038 (2002); see
also Charles E. McLure, Jr. & Walter Hellerstein, CongressionalIntervention in State
Taxation: A Normative Analysis of Three Proposals,31 ST. TAX NOTES 721, 734-35
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resolved on the more pragmatic basis of a firm's "economic presence"
in the taxing state, such as the level of its sales, property, or payroll."
Regardless, everyone seems to agree that the dormant Commerce
Clause imposes some jurisdictional requirements on state taxes; the
dispute concerns the nature of the nexus that should be necessary.
To me, this debate about Commerce Clause nexus standards,
while important in its own right, has overlooked a more foundational
question. In my view, we need to examine not just what the dormant
Commerce Clause should require in terms of state tax jurisdiction, but
whether the clause speaks to the question at all.
Before setting out my argument in full, let me explain its basic
points. As others have aptly explained, there are two distinct
components of state tax jurisdiction: "substantive jurisdiction" and
"enforcement jurisdiction." ' 9 Substantive jurisdiction concerns a
state's jurisdiction over the value or activity that it seeks to tax-the
income, the property, the sale, or the consumption, for example.
Enforcement jurisdiction, in contrast, concerns a state's regulatory
authority over the person or entity that it requires to pay or to collect
the tax.20 The Supreme Court has long interpreted the dormant
Commerce Clause to require that a taxing state have both substantive
and enforcement jurisdiction-that it have a sufficient nexus with both
the value or activity it seeks to tax and the person or entity it seeks to
pay or collect the tax.2'
(2004) (critiquing the justifications for extending the physical presence standard to
business activity taxes); McClaughlyn, supra note 15, at 980 (reporting the view of
Harley Duncan, executive director of the Federation of Tax Administrators, that a
national physical presence standard for income taxes would bless "the use of all sorts
of intangible holding companies" and "moving money around").
18 See Bucks & Katz, supra note 17, at 1037; Swain, supra note 12, at 373 93.
The Multistate Tax Commission (MTC), an organization formed by a majority of the
states to promote uniformity and coordination in state taxation, has proposed a
"factor presence" standard for determining state jurisdiction to impose business
activity taxes, such as corporate income taxes. See Doug Sheppard, MTC Approves
Factor Presence Nexus Standard, 26 ST. TAX NOTES 243 (2002). Under the MTC
proposal, a state would have enforcement jurisdiction to impose a business activity tax
on any firm with "(a) a dollar amount of $50,000 of property; or (b) a dollar amount
of $50,000 of payroll; or (c) a dollar amount of $500,000 of sales; or (d) 25 percent of
total property, total payroll or total sales" in the taxing state. Multistate Tax
Commission, FactorPresence Nexus Standard, 25 ST. TAX NOTES 1035, 1035 (2002).
19 Walter Hellerstein, Jurisdiction to Tax Income and Consumption in the New
Economy: A Theoreticaland ComparativePerspective, 38 GA. L. REV. 1, 3-4 (2003).
20 One component of jurisdiction can exist without the other.
See infra text
accompanying notes 22-24.
21 See infra notes 25-53 and accompanying text.
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of these

jurisdictional

requirements to the dormant Commerce Clause is, at least in part,
analytically confused and premised on some questionable empirical
assumptions. First, the requirement of substantive jurisdiction is
probably better conceived not as deriving from the dormant
Commerce Clause, but as a manifestation of the broader
constitutional prohibition on extraterritorial legislation. In our
federal system, states generally can legislate only with respect to those
activities that occur within their borders. This territorial limit on
states' legislative jurisdiction is a basic, unstated premise of our
Thus, although states generally are
constitutional structure.
prohibited from taxing values or activities occurring in other states,
this restraint exists independent of the dormant Commerce Clause.
The matter of enforcement jurisdiction-a state's authority to
impose tax compliance obligations on persons or entities engaged in
interstate commerce-is more complicated. The Supreme Court has
held that, without such a requirement, tax compliance obligations
would impose an undue burden on interstate commerce. But it is
unclear how much a firm's nexus with the taxing state actually affects
Once we
the costs of complying with that state's tax laws.
disaggregate the factors influencing the economic burden of tax
compliance, we find only two aspects of this burden that lend
credence to a jurisdictional requirement: the costs associated with a
firm's lack of familiarity with the state's tax laws, and the cost per
event attributable to a firm having only a limited number of taxable
events in the taxing state. Both sorts of costs would seem to increase
as a firm's nexus with the taxing state decreased. But these are only
two of several factors affecting the relevant burden on interstate
commerce, the rest of which are generally unrelated to nexus. And
the degree to which the relevant burden on interstate commerce
actually turns on these two factors remains an unanswered empirical
question. We therefore are left with a very uncertain basis for
concluding that, for firms lacking a certain connection to the taxing
state, the economic burden caused by tax compliance obligations is
actually "undue."
Ultimately, then, the case for interpreting the dormant Commerce
Clause to impose a nexus requirement with respect to state taxes is an
uneasy one. To be sure, the Commerce Clause uncontroversially
forbids states from discriminating against interstate commerce, and
taxes imposed on firms that have no connection to the taxing state will
often produce impermissible, discriminatory results. But it is unclear
whether the Commerce Clause itself says anything about these
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jurisdictional requirements. Indeed, the entire notion of Commerce
Clause nexus may be misconceived.
II.

THE CURRENT STATE OF STATE TAX JURISDICTION

Again, there are two distinct aspects of state tax jurisdiction:
substantive jurisdiction, which concerns a state's jurisdiction over the
value or activity the state seeks to tax, and enforcement jurisdiction,
which concerns a state's regulatory authority over the person on
whom it seeks to impose a tax compliance obligation.22 The two
components operate independently, such that one can exist without
the other. For example, when a Nevada resident purchases a new set
of dinnerware from Crate and Barrel through the company's web site,
Nevada has the substantive jurisdiction to impose a use tax on the
purchaser's use or storage of the dinnerware in Nevada. But unless
Crate and Barrel has a physical presence in Nevada (and it likely does
not, as it has no retail stores there 23), the state will lack the
enforcement jurisdiction necessary to force Crate and Barrel to collect
the use tax due on the dinnerware. Conversely, Nevada has the
enforcement jurisdiction necessary to require each of its residents to
pay a property tax on real estate they own. But Nevada lacks the
substantive jurisdiction necessary to impose that property tax on real
estate that is located outside the state. 24 The state would have
jurisdiction over the taxpayer, but it would lack jurisdiction over the
value being taxed.
With respect to substantive jurisdiction, the Supreme Court
appears to have first interpreted the Commerce Clause as imposing
this constraint on the states' taxing authority in the 1870s. 21 In the
1872 case of Morgan v. Parham, the Court invalidated an Alabama
property tax assessed on a ship that had visited the Port of Mobile but
was domiciled in New York City." Under the prevailing "home port
doctrine," the law deemed a ship to have its tax situs exclusively in its

22

Hellerstein, supra note 19, at 3-4.
See http://www.crateandbarrel.com/locator/listing.asp

(last visited Feb. 29,

2004).
24 See, e.g., Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Mo. State Tax Comm'n, 390 U.S. 317,
325

(1968) ("The taxation of property not located in the taxing State is constitutionally

invalid.").
25 See, e.g., Fargo v. Hart, 193 U.S. 490 (1904); Morgan v. Parham,
83 U.S. (16
Wall.) 471 (1872).
26 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 471 (1872).
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state of domicile. As the ship had only been in Mobile temporarily,
the Court held that "the State of Alabama had no jurisdiction over
this vessel for the purpose of taxation," 2" and that Alabama's attempt
to impose the tax therefore constituted "an interference with the
commerce of the country not permitted to the States. ' 9
Since Morgan v. Parham, the substantive jurisdiction requirement
has remained an important aspect of the Court's state and local tax
jurisprudence. It is presently embodied in the first prong of the

Supreme Court's four-part test for assessing state taxes under the
dormant Commerce Clause, first articulated in Complete Auto Transit,
Inc. v. Brady. °
In Complete Auto, the Court jettisoned a
longstanding, formalistic rule that states could not impose "taxes upon
the privilege of carrying on a business that was exclusively interstate in
character,, 31 instead reasoning that state taxes should be judged based
on their "practical effect" and "economic realities."3 The Court thus
held that a state tax will satisfy the Commerce Clause when it meets
four criteria: "the tax is applied to an activity with a substantial nexus
with the taxing State, is fairly apportioned, does not discriminate
against interstate commerce, and is fairly related to the services

27

See, e.g., Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 441-44

(1979) (discussing the substance and history of the home port doctrine); 1 JEROME R.
HELLERSTEIN & WALTER HELLERSTEIN, STATE TAXATION T 4.12[2][c] (3d ed. 2002).
2S Morgan, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at
476.
29 Id. at 479. Similarly, the Court held that Indiana's attempt to tax property
beyond its jurisdiction violated the Commerce Clause in the 1904 decision of Fargo v.
Hart, 193 U.S. 490 (1904). The taxpayer was an express company domiciled in New
York and doing business in several states, including Indiana. Id. at 495-96. Indiana
used the apportionment method to determine the value of the taxpayer's property
located in the state-that is, it multiplied the value of all of the taxpayer's property,
wherever located, by a fraction that reflected the percentage of the taxpayer's
property located in Indiana. Id. at 496. The taxpayer did not dispute the use of
apportionment generally, but it contested the inclusion in the apportionable base of
$15 million in bonds that it held at its New York offices. The Court upheld the
taxpayer's claim, finding that there was not the necessary "organic connection"
between the bonds and the taxpayer's property in Indiana that would justify their
inclusion in the apportionable base. Id. at 499-501. According to Justice Holmes,
Indiana had "attempt[ed] to tax property beyond the jurisdiction of the State," and
thus had imposed "an unconstitutional burden on commerce among the States." Id.
at 502.
30 430 U.S. 274 (1977).
31 Spector Motor Service v. O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602, 609 (1951) (emphasis in

original), overruledby Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977).
32 Complete Auto, 430 U.S. at 278-79.
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provided."33
The Court has invoked this four-part test in addressing virtually
every dormant Commerce Clause challenge to a state or local state tax
since Complete Auto was decided in 1977, and it has invalidated state
taxes when the state lacked a "substantial nexus" with the value it
sought to tax. 34 For example, at issue in Allied-Signal, Inc. v. Director,
Division of Taxation was whether New Jersey could tax an
apportioned share of an out-of-state corporation's gain on the sale of
stock it had held in an unrelated business.3 ' Because of the difficulty in
tracing income earned by an interstate business to its specific
geographic source through separate accounting,36 states (including
New Jersey) have long used the formulary apportionment method to
determine the amount of income earned by multistate corporations
within their borders.37 Under formulary apportionment, all income
earned by a taxpayer in the operation of its unitary business is
included in the taxpayer's apportionable tax base. That base is then
multiplied by a percentage determined by a statutory formula, a
formula that is designed to reflect the portion of the taxpayer's
economic activity occurring in the taxing state.38
Id. (emphasis added).
See, e.g., Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 US. 175, 183 (1995);
Barclays Bank PLC v. FranchiseTax Bd., 512 U.S. 298, 310-11 (1994); Itel Containers
Int'l Corp. v. Huddleston, 507 U.S. 60, 73 (1993); Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504
U.S. 298, 311 (1992); Trinova Corp. v. Mich. Dep't of Treasury, 498 U.S. 358, 372
(1991); Amerada Hess Corp. v. Dir., Div. of Taxation, 490 U.S. 66, 72-73 (1989);
Goldberg v. Sweet, 488 U.S. 252, 257-60 (1989); D.H. Holmes Co. v. McNamara, 486
U.S. 24, 30 (1988); Am. Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v. Scheiner, 483 U.S. 266, 291 (1987);
Wardair Can., Inc. v. Fla. Dep't of Revenue, 477 U.S. 1, 8 (1986); Commonwealth
Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 617 (1981); Marylandv. Louisiana,451 U.S. 725,
754 (1981); Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissionerof Taxes, 445 U.S. 425, 443 (1980); Dep't
of Revenue v. Ass'n of Wash. Stevedoring Cos., 435 U.S. 734, 745-46 (1978); see also
Walter Hellerstein, Michael J. McIntyre & Richard D. Pomp, Commerce Clause
Restraints on State Taxation After Jefferson Lines, 51 TAX L. REV. 47, 49 & n.13
(1995).
35 504 U.S. 768,722-77 (1992).
See JEROME R. HELLERSTEIN & WALTER HELLERSTEIN, STATE AND LOCAL
33
34

469-70 (7th ed. 2001); see also Mobil Oil, 445 U.S. at 438 ("[S]eparate
accounting, while it purports to isolate portions of income received in various States,
may fail to account for contributions to income resulting from functional integration,
centralization of management, and economies of scale.").
37 See Butler Bros. v. McColgan, 315 U.S. 501, 508-09 (1942) (holding that the
taxpayer's separate accounting evidence did nothing to "impeach the validity or
propriety" of the state's method of formulary apportionment).
38 See Bradley W. Joondeph, The Meaning of Fair Apportionment and the
TAXATION
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An important constitutional limit on the states' use of the
apportionment method is the "unitary business principle": a state can
only include in a taxpayer's apportionable tax base income that the
taxpayer has earned in the course of the unitary business that it carries
on in part in the taxing state.3 9 Without such an "organic connection"
between the taxing state and the income it seeks to apportion, the
state would lack jurisdiction to tax any portion of that income; the
essential justification for looking beyond the state's borders to°
lost.
determine the income earned in the taxing state would be
Because the Court in Allied-Signal determined that the taxpayer's
gain derived from business activity unrelated to the taxpayer's
business in New Jersey, the income could not "in fairness be
attributed to the taxpayer's activities within the taxing State., 4' That
is, New Jersey lacked a "substantial nexus" with the value it sought to
tax, rendering the levy invalid under the dormant Commerce Clause.
Less obviously-but perhaps redundantly-the requirement of
substantive tax jurisdiction also finds expression in the "fair
apportionment" prong of the Complete Auto test. 42
A fairly
apportioned tax will, by definition, only reach those values that are
reasonably attributable to the taxing state. When a state imposes a
fairly apportioned income tax on a multistate business, for example,
the state only taxes that income that one can reasonably say was
earned in the taxing state. Of course, another important purpose of
the fair apportionment requirement is to prevent multiple states from
taxing the same value, thereby disadvantaging interstate commerce.43
But as Walter Hellerstein has explained, "[w]holly apart from its role
in preventing multiple taxation, the fair apportionment criterion
serves to limit the territorial reach of state power by requiring that the
state's tax base corresponds to the taxpayer's in-state presence." 44
Prohibition on ExtraterritorialState Taxation, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 149, 155-56
(2002).
39 See, e.g., Allied-Signal, 504 U.S. at 778-88; ASARCO Inc. v. Idaho State Tax

Comm'n, 458 U.S. 307, 316-20 (1982); Exxon Corp. v. Wis. Dep't of Revenue, 447
U.S. 207, 223-24 (1980); Mobil Oil, 445 U.S. at 438-40; 1 HELLERSTEIN &
HELLERSTEIN, supra note 27, 8.07.
1 HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, supra note 27, 8.07[1].
Allied-Signal, 504 U.S. at 780.
42 See Joondeph, supra note
38, at 158.
43 Id. at 156-58.
44 Walter Hellerstein, is "Internal Consistency" Foolish?: Reflections
on an
Emerging Commerce Clause Restraint on State Taxation, 87 MICH. L. REV. 138, 186
(1988); see also James H. Peters, Sales/Use Taxes: Is Fair Apportionment a Proper
Test?, 6 ST. TAX NOTES 105, 105 (1994).
40
41
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Thus, as the Court has recognized, an essential aspect of the fair
apportionment inquiry is whether there exists an "economic
justification for the State's claim upon the value taxed, to discover
whether a State's tax reaches beyond that portion of value that is
4
fairly attributable to economic activity within the taxing State." 1
With respect to enforcement jurisdiction, the Court first seems to
have associated the dormant Commerce Clause with the requirement
that states have a certain nexus with the persons on whom they
impose tax compliance obligations in the late 1930s. For instance, the
1939 case of Felt & Tarrant Manufacturing Co. v. Gallagher involved
California's attempt to require an Illinois corporation to collect a use
tax on its sales to California residents. 46The Illinois company argued
that, although it had employed selling agents in California, it had
"carried on no intrastate operations" in the state and thus was "not
subject to its jurisdiction. 4' The Court disagreed, holding that the tax
collection obligation did not amount to a "direct burden upon
interstate commerce prohibited by the Federal Constitution.""
Nonetheless, the opinion entertained the argument that a state's lack
of jurisdiction with the collector of a tax could render the tax
impermissible under the Commerce Clause.
Under current doctrine, the requirement of enforcement
jurisdiction is represented in the first prong of the Complete Auto test.
A state must have a "substantial nexus" with any person or entity on
which it seeks to impose a tax compliance obligation, just as it must

45 Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175, 185 (1995).

306 U.S. 62 (1939).

47 Id. at 66.
48

Id.

49 Two years later, in the companion cases of Nelson v. Sears, Roebuck &
Co.,

312 U.S. 359 (1941), and Nelson v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 312 U.S. 373 (1941), the
Court similarly considered-but ultimately rejected-Commerce Clause challenges to
Iowa's requirement that out-of-state sellers collect use taxes on their mail-order sales
to Iowa customers. Sears and Montgomery Ward both maintained retail stores in
Iowa, but they also sold merchandise through mail orders, shipping the merchandise
from outside the state directly to customers via common carriers. Sears, 312 U.S. at
362; Montgomery Ward, 312 U.S. at 373-74. The Court held that Iowa's demand that
the retailers collect use taxes on their mail-order sales was consistent with the
Commerce Clause; the presence of their stores in the state provided a sufficient nexus
for Iowa to "exact this burden as a price of enjoying the full benefits flowing from
[their] Iowa business." Sears, 312 U.S. at 364. Despite rejecting the argument,
though, the Court again considered the possibility that a tax compliance obligation
might constitute an impermissible "burden upon interstate commerce" due to the
state's lack of enforcement jurisdiction. Id. at 365.
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have the same nexus with any value or activity it seeks to tax.' ° The
pivotal recent case is Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, where the Court
invalidated North Dakota's attempt to require an out-of-state seller of
office furniture to collect a use tax on its sales to North Dakota
residents. Quill had advertised in national periodicals that had been
sent into North Dakota and had solicited business from North Dakota
residents through other mailings and telephone calls. 5' But Quill
neither owned nor rented any property in the state, nor did it employ
any persons there.53 Because Quill had no more than a de minimis
physical presence in North Dakota, the Court held that the state
lacked the "substantial nexus" necessary to require Quill to collect use
taxes.5' Although North Dakota clearly had jurisdiction over the
value it sought to tax-the use of the furniture in North Dakotaimposing a compliance obligation on Quill violated the dormant
Commerce Clause.
It is important to bear in mind that these jurisdictional limits on
the states' taxing powers are not grounded exclusively in the dormant
Commerce Clause. For more than a century, the Court has also
understood the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to
prohibit a state from taxing interstate activities "unless there is a
minimal connection or nexus between the interstate activities and the
taxing State. 5' 5 As under the Commerce Clause, this due process
nexus requirement entails both substantive jurisdiction and
enforcement jurisdiction. Thus, the Court has invalidated numerous
state taxes under the Due Process Clause on the ground that the state
lacked a sufficient connection with the value or activity that it sought
to tax. ASARCO, Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Commission,5 6 F.W.
57
and Standard
Woolworth Co. v. Taxation and Revenue Department,
Oil v. Peck 8are a few examples. Likewise, the Court has struck down
state tax compliance obligations on due process grounds when the
state lacked a sufficient nexus with the firm required to collect the tax.
This was the case in National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of
50See I HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, supra note 27,
51

504 U.S. 298 (1992).

6.01.

52 Id. at 302.
53 Id.
54

Id. at 312-19.

55 Hunt-Wesson, Inc. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 528 U.S. 458, 464 (2000) (internal

quotations omitted).
56 458 U.S. 307 (1982).
458 U.S. 354 (1982).
342 U.S. 382 (1952).
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Revenue,s9 in which the Court invalidated the tax scheme at issue on
both Commerce Clause and due process grounds, and in Miller Bros.
v. Maryland.'°
Still, the nexus requirements of the dormant Commerce Clause
exist independently of those imposed by the Due Process Clause.
Indeed, because of the distinct purposes of the two clauses, the Court
has held that their
jurisdictional
requirements differ in content, at
.
61
least in some circumstances. The Due Process Clause, the Court has
explained, "centrally concerns the fundamental fairness of
government activity," such that "'notice' or 'fair warning' [is] the
analytic touchstone of due process nexus analysis., 62 Thus, with
respect to enforcement jurisdiction, a tax compliance obligation will
satisfy due process when the company "purposefully direct[s] its
activities" at the taxing state through the "continuous and widespread
63
solicitation of business" in that state.
In contrast, the dormant Commerce Clause "and its nexus
requirement are informed not so much by concerns about fairness for
the individual defendant as by structural concerns about the effects of
state regulation on the national economy." 64 Consequently, as
discussed above, the Commerce Clause requires that a firm have a
physical presence in the taxing state before a state can impose a tax
compliance obligation on that firm, at least with respect to the duty to
collect use taxes. 6' This physical presence standard is more rigorous
than the "purposeful availment" standard imposed by the Due
Process Clause. As the Court has explained, "a corporation may have
the 'minimum contacts' with a taxing State as required by the Due
Process Clause, and yet lack the 'substantial nexus' with that State as
required by the Commerce Clause." 66 Thus, in Quill, although North

59 386 U.S. 753 (1967). The Court subsequently overruled this aspect of
National
Bellas Hess in Quill, holding that there is no due process problem when the firm has
purposefully directed its activities at the taxing state, even though the firm lacks a
physical presence in the taxing state. Quilt Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 30708 (1992). Nonetheless, the larger point still holds: the Due Process Clause imposes
jurisdictional limits on the states' authority to tax that exist independent of those
mandated by the dormant Commerce Clause.
60 347 U.S. 340 (1954).
61 See 1 HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, supra note 27,
6.02.
62

Quill, 504 U.S. at 312.

63

Id. at 308.

64 Id. at 312.
65 See supra notes 53-54 and accompanying
text.
SId. at 313.
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Dakota's imposition of a use tax collection duty on Quill was
consistent with due process, the Court held that it nonetheless
violated the dormant Commerce Clause.
As a descriptive matter, each of these points of law is well settled.
The dormant Commerce Clause and the Due Process Clause both
require that states have substantive and enforcement jurisdiction.
These jurisdictional requirements operate independently and at times
differ in content. Although there has been significant disagreement in
recent years as to the appropriate breadth of state tax jurisdiction, the
controversy has generally concerned the substance of the dormant
Commerce Clause's "substantial nexus" requirement. To me, though,
this debate has missed a more fundamental problem. It is possible
that the ascription of any nexus requirements to the dormant
Commerce Clause-whether as a matter of substantive jurisdiction or
enforcement jurisdiction-is mistaken, and that the prevailing
approach to these questions has muddled our understanding of the
constitutional limits on the states' taxing authority. It is to these
points that I now turn.
III.

RETHINKING SUBSTANTIVE JURISDICTION

The central purpose of requiring states to have a sufficient nexus
with the activities or values that they seek to tax is to prohibit states
from engaging in extraterritorial taxation. That is, the requirement of
substantive
tax
jurisdiction -whatever
its
constitutional
underpinnings- ensures that the states only tax those values
attributable to activities occurring within their borders.
This
prohibition on extraterritorial taxes is a foundational principle of state
taxation, a limit on state authority that has been recognized by the
Supreme Court since the mid-1800s. 67 As the Court has frequently
67

See, e.g., Case of the State Tax on Foreign-held Bonds, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 300

(1872); R.R. v. Jackson, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 262 (1868); Hays v. Pac. Mail S. S. Co., 58
U.S. (17 How.) 596 (1854). See also Paul J. Hartman, State Taxation of Corporate
Income from a Multistate Business, 13 VAND. L. REV. 21, 31 n.31 (1959) (explaining
that the Court "imposed territorial limitations on the power of a state to tax" even

before the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment).
It is important to note that not all extraterritorial state taxation is impermissible,
although the Supreme Court has stated otherwise. See Joondeph, supra note 42, at
171-82. The Court's actual decisions demonstrate that where a state would face
genuine administrative burdens in taxing a particular form of commerce without
projecting its taxing authority beyond its borders, and the tax scheme at issue protects
interstate commerce from discrimination, a state may tax commercial activity
occurring in other states. See id.
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reiterated, "a State may not tax value earned outside its borders." 68
For instance, in the 1937 decision of Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co.
v. Grosjean, the Court explained that a "state may not tax real
property or tangible personal property lying outside her borders; nor
may she lay an excise or privilege tax upon the exercise or enjoyment
of a right or privilege in another state derived from the laws of that
state and therein exercised and enjoyed." 69 Or as Justice Stevens
more recently summarized the idea, "[i]t is fundamental that a State
has no power to impose a tax on income earned outside of the
State."7 °
Best understood, this prohibition on extraterritorial state taxation
is really a manifestation of the broader constitutional prohibition on
extraterritorial state legislation.7' While the federal government has
the authority to regulate conduct throughout the Nation, the
legislative jurisdictions of the states are generally confined to those
activities occurring within their borders.
As the Supreme Court
concisely stated in the 1905 case of Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v.
Kentucky, "the operation of state laws [is] limited to persons and
property within the boundaries of the State."' 73 Consider the Court's
ASARCO, Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n, 458 U.S. 307, 315 (1982); see also
Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 164 (1983); Exxon Corp.
v. Wis. Dep't of Revenue, 447 U.S. 207, 221 (1980); McLeod v. J. E. Dilworth Co., 322
U.S. 327, 330 (1944); Butler Bros. v. McColgan, 315 U.S. 501, 507 (1942); Conn. Gen.
Life Ins. v. Johnson, 303 U.S. 77, 80-81 (1938); Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. North
Carolina, 297 U.S. 682,685-86 (1936).
69 301 U.S. 412, 424 (citations omitted).
70 Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes,
445 U.S. 425, 451 (1980) (Stevens,
J., dissenting).
71 See Joondeph, supra note 42, at 173-74.
72 See e.g., BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 572-74 (1996); Bigelow
v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 822-24 (1975); Broderick v. Rosner, 294 U.S. 629, 642
(1935); Home Ins. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397, 411 (1930); Fid. & Deposit Co. v. Tafoya, 270
U.S. 426, 436 (1926); St. Louis Cotton Compress Co. v. Arkansas, 260 U.S. 346, 347349 (1922); N.Y. Life Ins. v. Dodge, 246 U.S. 357, 367-77 (1918); W. Union Tel. Co. v.
Brown, 234 U.S. 542, 546-47 (1914); N.Y. Life Ins. v. Head, 234 U.S. 149, 161 (1914);
Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 591 (1897); Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657,
669 (1892); Bonaparte v. Tax Court, 104 U.S. 592 (1881); 1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

§ 6-8, at 1074 (3d ed. 2000) ("the Court has

articulated virtually a per se rule of invalidity for extraterritorial state regulations i.e., laws which directly regulate out-of-state commerce, or laws whose operation is
triggered by out-of-state events").
73 199 U.S. 194, 204 (1905); see also St. Louis Cotton Compress, 260
U.S. at 349
("the State may regulate the activities of foreign corporations within the State but it
cannot regulate or interfere with what they do outside"); Bonaparte, 104 U.S. at 594
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treatment in New York Life Insurance v. Head of an attempt by
Missouri to regulate the terms of a life insurance contract, first signed
in Missouri but subsequently amended in New York, involving a New
Mexico beneficiary and a New York insurance company:
[W]e must consider.., how far it was within the power of the
State of Missouri to extend its authority into the State of New
York, and there forbid the parties, one of whom was a citizen
of New Mexico and the other a citizen of New York, from
making such loan agreement in New York simply because it
Such
modified a contract originally made in Missouri.
question, we think, admits of but one answer since it would be
impossible to permit the statutes of Missouri to operate
beyond the jurisdiction of that State and in the State of New
York, and there destroy freedom of contract without
throwing down the constitutional barriers by which all the
States are restricted within the orbits of their lawful authority
and upon the preservation of which the Government under
the Constitution depends. This is so obviously the necessary
result of the Constitution that it has rarely been called in
question.74
Recently the Court has invoked this limit on states' legislative
jurisdictions as a basis for invalidating punitive damage awards that
were intended, at least in part, to punish defendants for conduct that
had taken place in other states.75 In the 1996 decision of BMW of
North America, Inc. v. Gore, for instance, the Court struck down an
award partly on the ground that it amounted to extraterritorial
76
regulation.
The Court stated that "principles of state sovereignty
and comity" prohibit states from punishing tortfeasors for activity that
is lawful in other states 77 and that states cannot "impose sanctions on
[a defendant] in order to deter conduct that is lawful in other
jurisdictions."78' In 2003, the Court overturned a punitive damages
award in State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance v. Campbell where
the plaintiffs had attempted to use the lawsuit-and thus Utah law-

("No State can legislate except with reference to its own jurisdiction.").
74 234 U.S. 149, 161 (1914).
75 See Seth F. Kreimer, Lines in the Sand: The Importance of Borders in
American Federalism, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 973, 992-93 (2002).
76 517 U.S. 559 (1996).
77 Id. at 572.
78 Id. at 573.
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"to expose, and punish, the perceived deficiencies of State Farm's
operations throughout the country."79 This, the Court held, was
beyond the state's "legitimate concern." 80 "A basic principle of
federalism is that each State may make its own reasoned judgment
about what is permitted or proscribed within its borders, and each
State alone can determine what measures of punishment,
if any, to
81
jurisdiction.,
its
within
acts
who
defendant
a
on
impose
To be sure, the precise contours of this prohibition on
extraterritorial state legislation are not particularly well defined or
understood. 8' For instance, there is substantial disagreement about
the power of states to regulate the conduct of their own citizens when
they are visiting other states. 3 (The Court's opinion in Bigelow v.
Virginia," as well as its recent citation to Bigelow's relevant language
with approval, 8' however, suggests that states lack such authority
79 123 S. Ct. 1513, 1521 (2003).

Id. at 1522.
" Id. at 1523.
8o

82 See Jack L. Goldsmith & Alan 0.

Sykes, The Internet and the Dormant

Commerce Clause, 110 YALE L.J. 785, 789 (2001) ("The scope of the extraterritoriality
principle is unclear."); Donald H. Regan, Siamese Essays: (I) CTS Corp. v. Dynamics
Corp. of America and Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine; (II) ExtraterritorialState
Legislation, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1865, 1884 (1987) (noting that "we do not understand
the extraterritoriality principle (the principle that states may not legislate
extraterritorially) nearly as well as we should").
83 Compare Mark D. Rosen, Extraterritoriality and Political Heterogeneity
in
American Federalism, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 855, 862 (2002) (arguing that "states can
take reasonable steps, including extraterritorial regulation, to ensure the efficacy of
heterogeneous policies that themselves are not unconstitutional"), and Regan, supra
note 82, at 1908 ("Why should we not think of a state as having an interest in its
citizens which justifies regulation of their conduct wherever they may be?"), with
John Hart Ely, Choice of Law and the State's Interest in Protecting Its Own, 23 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 173, 192 (1981) ("[I]sn't there something somehow out of accord with
at least our 'small c constitution'- out of accord in particular with the reasons we as a
nation decided to supercede the Articles of Confederation-in adopting what
amounts to a system of 'personal law' wherein people carry their home states' legal
regimes around with them?"), and Kreimer, supra note 75, at 1017 (arguing that "the
text, history, structure, and practice of American federalism ... weigh heavily against
the extraterritorial assertion of moralism to punish actions that take place on the soil
of and with the permission of sister states").
84 421 U.S. 809
(1975).
'5 See State Farm, 123 S. Ct. at 1522 (parenthetically quoting Bigelow for the
proposition that "[a] State does not acquire power or supervision over the internal
affairs of another State merely because the welfare and health of its own citizens may
be affected when they travel to that State"); BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S.
559, 571 n.16 (1996) (quoting same language).
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under current law.) Moreover, it is unclear precisely under what
circumstances cross-border effects can justify the regulation of out-ofstate conduct. Nuisance law, product liability statutes, and municipal
obscenity ordinances, for instance, have traditionally regulated local
effects in a manner that necessarily affects behavior in other states.8
At the same time, California surely could not ban the manufacturing
of cigarettes in Kentucky based on the adverse health consequences to
Californians from their smoking cigarettes in California. 7 These
complications are unimportant to the present discussion, however.
For our purposes, it suffices that, no matter what the
extraterritoriality principle provides in fine detail, states' legislative
jurisdictions are generally delimited by their geographic territories.
Given the Supreme Court's view that the dormant Commerce
Clause imposes a substantive jurisdictional requirement on state
taxing authority, it is unsurprising that the Court has also held that the
Commerce Clause forbids extraterritorial state legislation more
generally. Indeed, the Court has long held that "a state law that has
the 'practical effect' of regulating commerce occurring wholly outside
that State's borders is invalid under the Commerce Clause.""8 For
example, consider the Court's 1935 decision in Baldwin v. G. A. F.
Seelig, Inc., which invalidated a New York law that prohibited the sale
in New York of milk that had been purchased from out-of-state milk
producers at a price lower than the minimum price for New Yorkproduced milk.8 9 In holding that the law violated the dormant
Commerce Clause, the Court specifically alluded to its extraterritorial
reach: "New York has no power to project its legislation into Vermont
by regulating the price to be paid in that state for milk acquired
there."" Similarly, the Court in Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v.
New York State Liquor Authority" and in Healy v. Beer Institute, Inc.9'
invoked the dormant Commerce Clause to invalidate state liquor
price-affirmation statutes that had the practical effect of regulating the
prices at which liquor could be sold in other states. As the Court
stated in Healy, "the 'Commerce Clause... precludes the application
of a state statute to commerce that takes place wholly outside of the
State's borders, whether or not the commerce has effects within the
See Goldsmith & Sykes, supra note 83, at 795-96.
87 See Regan, supra note 82, at 1899-1900.
88

Healy v. Beer Inst,, Inc., 491 U.S. 324, 332 (1989).

89 294 U.S. 511 (1935).
90 Id. at 521.
91 476 U.S. 573 (1986).
92 491 U.S. 324 (1989).
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State." 93
On reflection, though, it seems that the unconstitutionality of laws
like those at issue in Seelig, Brown-Forman, and Healy-laws that
effectively regulate commercial activity in other states-should not
depend on the Commerce Clause. As Donald Regan has argued,
"extraterritoriality is not in essence a commerce clause problem." 94
Rather, state laws that attempt to regulate conduct occurring in other
states are unconstitutional regardless of their impact on interstate
commerce. Imagine a hypothetical state law concerning gay civil
unions (an example I borrow largely from Professor Regan). 9 Such
unions are presently recognized in Vermont 96 (and perhaps soon in
Massachusetts 9') but generally no place else.9' And under current law,
states have no obligation to make civil unions available to their gay
citizens, even though their laws permit and recognize marriages
between heterosexual couples. Suppose that Nebraska enacted a law
that prohibited any person from participating in a gay civil union
ceremony, no matter where that ceremony took place. And suppose
that a gay Vermont couple, previously joined by a civil union in their
home state, was arrested while traveling in Omaha and prosecuted by
Nebraska authorities for having participated in a gay civil union
ceremony.
It seems obvious that the Nebraska law would be
unconstitutional. 9 Nebraska lacks the authority to regulate the
behavior of Vermont citizens that takes place in Vermont, no matter
how morally objectionable that behavior might be to Nebraskans. Yet
Nebraska's law does not regulate commercial activity, interstate or
otherwise. Indeed, the reasons often conjured as to why the law is
unconstitutional have nothing to do with commerce. The problem is
Id. at 336 (quoting Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 642-43 (1982)
(plurality opinion)). See also Pharm. Research and Mfrs. v. Maine Dep't of Human
Servs., 123 S. C1. 1855, 1870-71 (2003) (analyzing claim that Maine's prescription drug
program, Maine Rx, constituted extraterritorial state legislation prohibited by the
dormant Commerce Clause).
Regan, supra note 82, at 1887.
See id. at 1888-89. Regan's example involves an extraterritorial state law
prohibiting gay sodomy, a law that would now be unconstitutional under Lawrence v.
Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003), independent of any extraterritoriality concerns.
See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15 §§ 1202-1207 (2002).
97 See Pam Belluck, The Gay-MarriageDebate Resumes in Massachusetts,
N.Y.
TIMES, March 12, 2004, at A12.
98 See Sarah Kershaw, Adversaries on Gay Rights Vow State-by-State
Fight,N.Y.
TIMES, July 6, 2003, at A8.
99 See Regan, supra note 82, at 1888.
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more fundamental. As the Court reasoned in Healy-without any
direct reference to the Commerce Clause -"'any attempt "directly" to
assert extraterritorial jurisdiction over persons or property would
offend sister States and exceed the inherent limits of the State's
power.""
Regan has argued that the prohibition on extraterritorial state
legislation is not grounded in any particular provision in the
Constitution's text. Instead, it is "one of those foundational principles
of our federalism which we infer from the structure of the
Constitution as a whole."'' I tend to agree. It seems analogous to the
principle recognized in McCulloch v. Maryland"2 that prohibits states
from singling out the instrumentalities of the federal government for
taxation, a limitation necessitated by the structure of our federal
system.10 3 It seems plausible, however, that extraterritorial state laws
might also violate the norms of fundamental fairness protected by the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.' 4 Indeed, the
Court in several cases has invalidated extraterritorial state laws on
due process grounds.
In any event, the prohibition on
extraterritoriality probably should not be grounded in the Commerce
Clause. While an extraterritorial state law might violate the dormant
Commerce Clause by discriminating against or unduly burdening
interstate commerce, it should not be understood as violating the
Commerce Clause simply because it is extraterritorial.
If extraterritoriality itself does not offend the Commerce Clause,
it follows that the requirement of substantive tax jurisdiction does not
derive from the Commerce Clause, either. A couple of examples
illustrate the point.
Consider the taxation of purely intrastate
commercial activity. Suppose California imposed an income tax on an
Oregon company that did business exclusively within Oregon. This
100Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 336 n.13 (quoting Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457
U.S. 624, 643 (1982) (plurality opinion) (quoting Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 197
(1977)))(emphasis added).
101Regan, supra note 82, at 1885.
102 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
103

See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 85-86 (1980).

IN But see Regan, supra note 82, at 1889-92 (arguing that extraterritorial state
legislation does not violate the Due Process Clause).
105 See, e.g., Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 818-21 (1985);
Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v, Delta & Pine Land Co., 292 U.S. 143, 149 (1934).
The Court's more recent decisions concerning punitive damages-BMW of North
America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996), and State Farm Mutual Automobile
Insurance v. Campbell, 123 S. Ct. 1513 (2003) -also appear to be grounded in the Due
Process Clause.
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would plainly be unconstitutional, just like the Nebraska law
prohibiting gay civil unions between Vermonters in Vermont;
California would lack the requisite substantive jurisdiction to impose
the tax. But the absence of nexus between California and the income
it sought to tax would not, in itself, violate the dormant Commerce
Clause. The dormant Commerce Clause would be inapposite, as the
tax is not imposed on a firm engaged in interstate commerce. Instead,
the tax would be unconstitutional simply because it taxed
extraterritorial values-because it projected California's legislative
authority beyond its borders.
Or consider a state tax imposed on completely noncommercial
activity. Suppose California imposed a tax on the possession of a gun
in a school zone in Texas. We know from United States v. Lopez that
the possession of a gun in a school zone does not substantially affect
interstate commerce; in fact, it "has nothing to do with 'commerce' or
any sort of economic enterprise, however broadly one might define
those terms."'6 Thus, a state tax on such activity would not be subject
to dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny.'0 7 Yet California would
clearly lack the substantive jurisdiction necessary to impose such a tax.
It would amount to an "assert[ion of] extraterritorial jurisdiction over
persons or property" in other states, and thus "exceed the inherent
limits of the State's power."''0
This understanding of the constitutional basis for the substantive
jurisdiction requirement is reinforced by some of the Supreme Court's
earliest decisions addressing the breadth of states' taxing authority. In
a handful of opinions from the middle nineteenth century, the Court
invalidated state taxes that operated extraterritorially without any
reference to the dormant Commerce Clause. Instead, the Court
simply found the taxes to be ultra vires, beyond the states' legislative
powers. Consider the Court's 1854 decision in Hays v. Pacific Mail
Steamship Co.,1 9 handed down thirteen years before the Court first

1D6 514 U.S. 459, 561 (1995).

107 See Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 574

(1997) (holding that "[t]he definition of 'commerce' is the same when relied on to
strike down or restrict state legislation as when relied on to support some exertion of
federal control or regulation") (quoting Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 326 n.2
(1979)).
108Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 336 n.13 (quoting Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457

U.S. 624, 643 (1982) (plurality opinion) (quoting Shaffer v. Hcitner, 433 U.S. 186, 197
(1977))) (emphasis added).
109 58 U.S. (17 How.) 596 (1854).
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invalidated a state tax on Commerce Clause grounds" ° and fourteen
years before the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment. The
taxpayer, a New York corporation, owned steamships that had their
home port in New York but which spent a few weeks each year in
California, in the ports of San Francisco and Benicia."' California
imposed a property tax on the vessels based on these visits to
California."' The Court held that New York was the tax situs of the
'
ships, and therefore no other state could tax them as property.13
Without any citation to the Commerce Clause, the Court stated
simply that "the State of California had no jurisdiction over these
vessels for the purpose of taxation. '1 4
The Court used similar reasoning in its 1870 decision of St. Louis
v. Ferry Co.'I St. Louis had imposed a tax on the taxpayer's ferry
boats, which traversed the Mississippi River between Illinois and
Missouri 16 In analyzing the taxpayer's claim, the Court spoke
exclusively in terms of the inherent limits on a state's legislative
jurisdiction, without any reference to the Commerce Clause:
The [state tax] authority extends over all persons and
property within the sphere of its territorial jurisdiction....
Where there is jurisdiction neither as to person nor property,
the imposition of a tax would be ultra vires and void. If the
legislature of a State should enact that the citizens or property
of another State or country should be taxed in the same
manner as the persons and property within its own limits and
subject to its authority, or in any other manner whatsoever,
such a law would be as much a nullity as if in conflict with the
most explicit constitutional inhibition. Jurisdiction is as
necessary to valid legislative as to valid judicial action." 7
After determining that the home port of the boats was in Illinois, the
110

The Court first struck down a state tax under the dormant Commerce Clause

in Steamship Co. v. Portwardens,73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 31 (1867). See 1 HELLERSTEIN &
HELLERSTEIN, supra note 27, $ 4.12[2][c].
I Hays, 58 U.S. (17 How.) at 597.
12 Id. at 597-98.
113 Id at 599-600.
14 Id. at 599. See also 1 HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, supra
note 27, 1 4.12[21[c]
(noting that the Court in Hays "did not refer to the Commerce Clause in its
opinion").
115

16
117

78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 423 (1870).
Id. at 428-29.
Id. at 429-30.
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Court held that St. Louis's levy was "beyond the jurisdiction of the
authorities by which the taxes were assessed." 8
These decisions suggest that the Court originally recognized that
the constitutional requirement that states have substantive jurisdiction
over the values they seek to tax exists independent of the Commerce
Clause. Of course, extraterritorial state taxes will often violate the
dormant Commerce Clause. When a state projects its taxing authority
into other states, it typically creates a risk of multiple taxation-that
is, a risk that the same value will be taxed simultaneously by two
states. If the risk of multiple taxation is attributable to the taxpayer
doing business in more than one state, then it will generally violate the
dormant Commerce Clause.119 Such multiple taxation disadvantages
firms engaged in interstate commerce relative to those doing business
exclusively in one state, and thus discriminates against interstate
commerce in practical effect. Indeed, the Court has explained the
requirement that states have substantive tax jurisdiction in precisely
these terms: "The reason the Commerce Clause includes this limit is
self-evident: in a Union of 50 States, to permit each State to tax
activities outside its borders would have drastic consequences for the
national economy,
as businesses could be subjected to severe multiple
, 120
taxation.
What the Court seems to have misunderstood, though, is that it is
really the consequent discrimination against interstate commerce that
violates the dormant Commerce Clause, not the state's lack of nexus
with the value or activity that it seeks to tax. Put differently, although
extraterritorial state taxes often violate the Commerce Clause, they
should not be understood to violate the Commerce Clause because of
their extraterritoriality. To ascribe the extraterritoriality principle to
...Id. at 432. Likewise, in its 1872 decision Case of the State Tax on Foreign-Held

Bonds, 82 U.S. (15. Wall.) 300 (1872), the Court concluded that a tax was beyond a
state's substantive jurisdiction based solely on the Court's conception of the inherent
limits on state authority. The Court began its analysis by stating that "[t]he power of
taxation, however vast in its character and searching in its extent, is necessarily
limited to subjects within the jurisdiction of the State." Id. at 319. Relying on neither
the Commerce Clause nor the Due Process Clause, the Court thus concluded that
Pennsylvania's attempt to tax the bonds issued by a Pennsylvania corporation but
owned by out-of-state bondholders was unconstitutional. Id. at 325-26. "When the
property is out of the State there can then be no tax upon it for which the interest can
be retained. The tax laws of Pennsylvania can have no extra-territorial operation."
Id. at 325-26.
119See Walter Hellerstein, State Taxation of Interstate Business: Perspective
on

Two Centuries of ConstitutionalAdjudication, 41
120

TAX LAW.

37, 48-50 (1987).

Allied-Signal, Inc. v. Dir., Div. of Taxation, 504 U.S. 768, 777-78 (1992).
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the dormant Commerce Clause is to conflate analytically distinct
constitutional principles.
In short, the dormant Commerce Clause is best understood as not
imposing any substantive jurisdictional requirements on the states'
taxing powers. Although states must have a sufficient nexus with the
values they seek to tax-they generally cannot project their taxing
powers beyond their borders-this principle has its basis elsewhere in
the Constitution. Perhaps it is an essential premise of our federal
system; perhaps it is required by the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment; or perhaps both are true. But attributing
this nexus requirement to the dormant Commerce Clause seems both
unnecessary and misconceived.
IV. RETHINKING ENFORCEMENT JURISDICTION
Again, in addition to substantive jurisdiction, the Supreme Court
has held that the dormant Commerce Clause requires that states have
enforcement jurisdiction before imposing a tax. That is, states must
have a "substantial nexus" with any person or entity on which they
seek to impose tax compliance obligations. And, at least with respect
to the duty to collect
sales or use taxes, the Court has held that this
12 1
1 1•
"substantial nexus" means a "physical presence" in the taxing state.
The Court's justification for ascribing this nexus requirement to the
dormant Commerce Clause is that, without it, tax compliance
obligations would place an "undue burden" on interstate commerce.122
The notion that state laws imposing undue burdens on interstate
commerce are unconstitutional is nothing new. 12' For many years, the
Court has held that the dormant Commerce Clause, in addition to
proscribing discrimination against interstate commerce, forbids states
from placing burdens on interstate commerce that are "clearly

121 See Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 312-13
(1992).

122Id. at 311-13; see also Swain, supra note 12, at 334-36.

123See, e.g., Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 443
(1960) ("Evenhanded local regulation to effectuate a legitimate local public interest is
valid unless pre-empted by federal action.., or unduly burdensome on maritime
activities or interstate commerce."); Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520,
529 (1959) ("This is one of those cases-few in number-where local safety measures
that are nondiscriminatory place an unconstitutional burden on interstate
commerce."); Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.S. 373, 377 (1946) ("[S]tate legislation is
invalid if it unduly burdens that commerce in matters where uniformity is necessarynecessary in the constitutional sense of useful in accomplishing a permitted
purpose.").
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excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.' ' 12 4 Some justices
have questioned the legitimacy of this doctrine's explicit call for the
judicial balancing of costs and benefits. On the present Court, for
instance, Justices Scalia and Thomas believe that "[w]eighing the
governmental interests of a State against the needs of interstate
commerce is... a task squarely within the responsibility of Congress,
and 'ill suited to the judicial function."" For present purposes, I do
not challenge the soundness of this "undue burden" analysis. Instead,
my objective is to assess whether the dormant Commerce Clause, so
construed, should be understood to require that states have a certain
nexus with firms before imposing tax compliance obligations on them.
The first step in this inquiry is to identify the relevant burdens on
interstate commerce. What exactly are the costs incurred by a firm in
fulfilling state tax compliance obligations? They would seem to be the
costs in learning the applicable tax laws, in accounting for the taxable
events (and the states to which they are attributable), and in filing the
necessary returns. These costs might be absorbed in the use of the
firm's own employees, in the hiring of outside professionals, such as
lawyers and accountants, or in the acquisition of various accounting
mechanisms, such as computer software. And what determines the
magnitude of these costs? There seem to be six principal factors: (1)
the number of states (or local governments) imposing such
obligations, (2) the complexity of those states' laws, (3) the
disuniformity of those states' laws, (4) the size of the firm on which
the obligation is imposed, (5) the familiarity of the firm with the
various states' tax laws, and (6) the frequency of the firm's taxable
events occurring in a given state.
The Supreme Court has justified the dormant Commerce Clause's
enforcement jurisdiction requirement in terms of the costs
attributable to the first three factors-the number of jurisdictions that
124

Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970); see also C & A Carbone,

Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 390 (1994); Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131,

138 (1986); Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 471 (1981); City of
Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978); Great Atd. & Pac. Tea Co. v.
Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366, 376 (1976).
125 Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enters., Inc., 486 U.S. 888, 897 (1988)
(Scalia, J., concurring in judgment) (quoting CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp., 481 U.S.
69, 95 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment)) (citation omitted);
see also Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 618
(1997) (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("[O]ur negative Commerce Clause jurisprudence has
taken us well beyond the invalidation of obviously discriminatory taxes on interstate
commerce. We have used the Clause to make policy-laden judgments that we are ill
equipped and arguably unauthorized to make.").
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could impose such obligations and the complexity and disuniformity
of their tax laws. In National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Illinois, for
instance-the decision adopting the "physical presence" standard for
jurisdiction to require the collection of use taxes, later reaffirmed in
Quill-the Court explained that "if Illinois can impose such burdens,
so can every other State, and so, indeed, can every municipality, every
school district, and every other political subdivision throughout the
Nation with power to impose sales and use taxes."'26 This, the Court
reasoned, "could entangle [a firm's] interstate business in a virtual
welter of complicated obligations," given the "many variations in rates
of tax, in allowable exemptions, and in administrative and recordkeeping requirements.' 2 7
The Court's reasoning in Quill was essentially indistinguishable.
North Dakota had attempted to require any seller that placed three or
more advertisements in the state within a 12-month period to collect a
use tax on sales to North Dakota customers 1 8 The Court stated that,
without this physical presence requirement,
[A] publisher who included a subscription card in three issues
of its magazine, a vendor whose radio advertisements were
heard in North Dakota on three occasions, and a corporation
whose telephone sales force made three calls into the State,
all would be subject to the collection duty. What is more
significant, similar obligations might be imposed by the
Nation's 6,000-plus taxing jurisdictions. 9
The Court then quoted parenthetically the "virtual welter of
30
complicated obligations" language from National Bellas Hess.1
The problem with this logic, though, is that these are costs
incurred by all firms engaged in interstate commerce, not just firms
lacking a certain nexus with the taxing state. Put differently, the
burden on interstate commerce attributable to the existence of
multiple states with complex, heterogeneous taxing schemes is
unrelated to a firm's presence in the taxing state. These burdens
really have nothing to do with nexus."'
126 386 U.S. 753, 759 (1967).

Id. at 759-60.
Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 302-03 (1992).
129 Id. at 313 n.6.
130 Id. (quoting Nat'l Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 759-60).
131 The Court alternatively justified the "substantial nexus" requirement in
Quill-and specifically the physical presence standard for that requirement-on the
127
12
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For instance, compare Barnes and Noble with Amazon.com.
Barnes and Noble operates retail bookstores throughout the country,
and thus has a "substantial nexus" with all fifty states under present
law. In making sales at these stores, as well as by phone and over the
Internet, Barnes and Noble endures all of the costs associated with
multiple, complex, and disuniform state sales and use tax laws; it faces
the same economic burden attributable to these factors as
Amazon.com would were Amazon.com required to collect these taxes
as well. In other words, the costs caused by the complexity and
disuniformity of various states' tax laws would be no greater for
Amazon.com just because it lacks a physical presence in most states.
Conversely, Amazon.com's compliance costs attributable to these
factors would not decrease if it chose to open a small sales office and
hire a handful of employees in every state."'
Moreover, the idea that the diversity and complexity of state tax
schemes would, for this reason alone, violate the dormant Commerce
Clause seems inconsistent with basic principles of federalism.'33 As
Donald Regan has explained, to suggest that there is a national
interest in uniform state law "is very nearly to make nonsense of the
whole idea of federal union."' 3 An essential "reason for having
separate states is to allow diversity" in state laws, 13 in the field of
ground that it established a bright-line rule that "firmly establishes the boundaries of
legitimate state authority to impose a duty to collect sales and use taxes and reduces
litigation concerning those taxes." Id. at 315. The Court further noted that such "a
bright-line rule in the area of sales and use taxes also encourages settled expectations
and, in doing so, fosters investment by businesses and individuals." Id. at 316. But
this argument merely begs the relevant question. Even if we assume that a bright-line
rule reduces the burden on interstate commerce caused by state tax compliance
obligations, we still need some justification for the content of that rule. For instance,
we might interpret the dormant Commerce Clause to forbid states from imposing tax
compliance obligations on any firm with annual gross revenues under $100 million.
This would be a clear rule, but we would need some justification for the rule other
than its clarity. We would need some explanation as to why the firm's gross revenues
(and why a level of $100 million) form a logical basis on which to draw the bright line.
132 See Swain, supra note 12, at 335 ("It is difficult to argue,
for example, that
Quill Corporation's compliance burden would be less if it periodically sent sales
representatives into the state, or had a small office in Sioux Falls.").
...See Regan, supra note 82, at 1881-82; Donald H. Regan, The Supreme Court
and State Protectionism:Making Sense of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 MICH. L.
REV. 1091, 1177 (1986) [hereinafter Regan, Supreme Court and State Protectionism].
134 Regan, Supreme Court and State Protectionism, supra note 133, at 1177.
135 Id. See also Cass R. Sunstein, Federal Appeal Massachusetts Gets It Right,
THE NEW REPUBLIC, Dec. 22, 2003, at 21, 23 ("The genius of the federal system lies in
the fact that, while requiring nationwide respect for certain rights, it allows the law to
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taxation as much as any other. Unsurprisingly, then-except in this
area of state tax enforcement-the Supreme Court has not considered
the disuniformity of state law a dormant Commerce Clause problem
other than when such disuniformity threatened to clog the physical
For instance, in cases like Kassel v.
channels of interstate commerce. 136
Consolidated137138
Freightways Corp.,
Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines,

Inc., 3' and Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, the Court invalidated
state laws addressing the physical characteristics of tractor-trailer
trucks and railroad cars because those laws diverged from the norms
set by surrounding states. But the basis for these holdings was not the
cost of complying with the divergent state laws per se; rather, it was
the clogging effect that these outlier rules were apt to have on the
physical channels of interstate transportation. Thus, nonuniformity
itself has not been a Commerce Clause issue in other contexts, and
from that understanding with
there is no apparent reason to_ depart
139
respect to state tax enforcement.
The fourth principal factor influencing the cost of state tax
compliance obligations on a given firm is the firm's size. A larger,
more sophisticated firm should have the infrastructure to incur the
costs of tax compliance obligations less expensively than a small firm,
at least as a percentage of the firm's total revenue. But a firm's size
adapt to the states' diverse cultures, providing extensive room for experimentation
and learning.").
13 450 U.S. 662
(1981).
137 359 U.S. 520 (1959).
138 325 U.S. 761 (1945).
139 Interestingly, this principle also applies to the assessment of burdens on free
In Sable
speech caused by diverse community standards of decency.
Communications,Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989), for example, the Court considered
the constitutionality of a federal statute that prohibited obscene telephone messages
sent by "dial-a-porn" operators. The plaintiff claimed in part that the statute violated
the First Amendment because it effectively required speakers to incur the costs of
adjusting their messages to varying community standards of decency. See id. at 12426. The Court rejected the claim, holding that the burden of complying with diverse
standards was constitutionally acceptable. Id. at 124. "While Sable may be forced to
incur some costs in developing and implementing a system for screening the locale of
incoming calls, there is no constitutional impediment to enacting a law which may
impose such costs on a medium electing to provide these messages." Id. at 125. Thus,
although the speaker's audience might be "comprised of different communities with
different local standards," the speaker "ultimately bears the burden of complying with
the prohibition on obscene messages." Id. at 126.
Sable is no anomaly; the Court rejected very similar claims in Hamling v. United
States, 418 U.S. 87 (1974), involving messages sent by mail, and Ashcroft v. ACLU,
535 U.S. 564 (2002), involving messages sent over the Internet.
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also is unrelated to its nexus with a given state. Large firms are not
necessarily more likely to have a nexus with taxing states, and small
firms are not necessarily apt to be nexus-free. Nexus is, at best, a very
rough proxy for presence. Amazon.com is large and sophisticated,
while other firms may be small but have employees in several states.
Whether a firm has a certain type of connection to the taxing state
really concerns the manner in which a firm does business with that
state's customers, not its size. ' °
It is only the costs associated with the last two factors-the firm's
familiarity with the state's laws and the frequency of its taxable events
in the taxing state-that logically support the argument that the
dormant Commerce Clause should include a nexus requirement.
Specifically, the greater the firm's connection to the taxing state, it
seems, the more likely the firm will be familiar with the state's tax
laws. And assuming the existence of economies of scale in tax
compliance, the average cost of tax compliance should decline as the
number of the firm's taxable events attributable to the taxing stateitself a form of nexus-increases. Both of these factors lend some
support to an enforcement jurisdiction requirement as an aspect of the
dormant Commerce Clause. It seems logical to assume that, as a
firm's nexus with a given state decreases, the firm's costs of tax
compliance attributable to its unfamiliarity with the state's tax laws
and to its limited number of taxable events in the state (with cost
measured on a per event basis) would increase.
But is the magnitude of the economic burden attributable to these
two factors sufficient to justify interpreting the Commerce Clause to
require states to have a certain connection with a firm before
imposing a tax compliance duty? The answer seems to turn on some
significant empirical uncertainties. In particular, how much of the
relevant economic burden depends on a firm's familiarity with the
state's tax laws? To what degree do the potential efficiencies that
come with economies of scale actually reduce the economic burden of
state tax compliance? And how tightly do these two factors correlate
with the level of a firm's presence-whether physical, economic, or
otherwise-in the taxing state?
The Supreme Court did not cite any empirical evidence on these
questions in either National Bellas Hess or Quill, and subsequent
research does not appear to have uncovered any answers. 4' Further,
140

Cf Swain, supra note 12, at 335 (making basically the same point with respect

to physical presence).
141 In contrast, empirical studies have demonstrated that the complexity
and
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even if we found that a significant portion of the relevant burden
indeed depended on these factors, and that these costs correlated with
a firm's level of nexus, could we say that the burden on firms lacking a
certain nexus with the taxing state was "clearly excessive" in relation
to the benefits accruing to the state from imposing its tax
evenhandedly on all firms selling to its residents? This last question
ultimately calls for political judgment, but without more empirical
evidence, I find it difficult to say yes.
Of course, requiring states to have a certain level of nexus with
those persons or entities on which they impose tax compliance
obligations is perfectly sensible as a matter of fairness. If a firm has
essentially no connection with a state, and does not purposefully
direct its activities toward that state in any meaningful sense, it may be
fundamentally unjust for that state to require the company to
shoulder the burdens that come with tax compliance duties. The state
may not have provided the firm with anything justifying the
imposition, and the firm may lack fair notice that its activities would
trigger the obligation. But as the Court itself explained in Quill,
"'notice' or 'fair warning' [is] the analytic touchstone of due process
nexus analysis. 142 The dormant Commerce Clause, in contrast, is
"informed not so much by concerns about fairness for the individual
defendant as by structural concerns about the effects of state
regulation on the national economy. ,1 41 In other words, fairness is
invisible to the Commerce Clause.
We are thus left with a fairly unsatisfying rationale for requiring
tax enforcement jurisdiction under the dormant Commerce Clause.
The justification articulated by the Supreme Court-based on the
costs associated with numerous taxing jurisdictions applying complex
and disuniform tax laws-does not seem to withstand scrutiny. Nor
can the increased costs of tax compliance for smaller, less
sophisticated firms justify a nexus requirement, as size and nexus are
largely unrelated. Instead, the soundness of the rule depends on the
economic burden attributable to firms' not being especially familiar
with a state's tax laws and having a limited number of taxable events
disuniformity of state tax laws increase the costs of state tax compliance. See Sanjay
Gupta & Lillian F. Mills, Does Disconformity in State CorporateIncome Tax Systems
Affect Compliance Cost Burdens?, 56 NAT'L TAX J. 355, 370 (2003) (concluding that
"state income tax compliance costs are largely driven by complexity and
disconformity"). As discussed above, however, the costs attributable to these factors
do not logically justify a nexus requirement.
142

Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 312 (1992) (emphasis added).

143

Id.
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in the taxing state. But we simply do not know how much of the
relevant burden turns on these factors, or the degree to which these
factors correlate with a firm's nexus with the taxing state. In other
words, the edifice of Commerce Clause nexus rests on a shaky
empirical foundation.
V. CONCLUSION

In the end, then, the case for interpreting the dormant Commerce
Clause to impose a nexus requirement with respect to state taxes
appears to be an uneasy one. The requirement that states have
substantive jurisdiction over the values or activities they seek to tax
seems more a reflection of the Constitution's general prohibition on
extraterritorial state legislation than something grounded in the
Commerce Clause.
And the requirement that states have
enforcement jurisdiction before imposing tax compliance obligations
ultimately rests on some contestable empirical assumptions. This is
not to say that the Constitution imposes no jurisdictional restrictions
on the breadth of states' taxing authority; indeed, both the Due
Process Clause and the structural premises of our federal system
impose important limitations that demand a certain connection
between taxing states and the firms and activities they seek to tax.
Rather, the point is that it might make sense to divest these
jurisdictional requirements from the dormant Commerce Clause. It
might be time to discard the concept of Commerce Clause nexus.
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